Benjamin Giltner
Yesterday, the House of Representative voted on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which determines the authorized funds for next year’s defense budget. A major feat, though long overdue, is Congress’s repeal of the Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) related to Iraq. However, this NDAA still has the same problem as those of years past—namely, its insistence on maintaining a fiscally unsound military machine to pursue ill-defined national objectives.
Some, including the New York Times and Washington Post editorial boards, are wont to note that the United States must spend more on defense to help defend “the free world” and that defense spending at 3.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is at its “lowest level in more than 80 years.” Yet, using percentage of GDP to determine the spending amount for a federal sector is extremely misleading. A growing economy doesn’t make its citizens less safe and in need of more defense spending. Nor does defense spending as a percentage of GDP accurately illustrate the changes to defense spending over time.
Compare, for instance, the Reagan administration’s $762.93 billion (in 2025 dollars) in national defense outlays in 1985 compared to the Biden administration’s $874.37 billion (in 2025 dollars) in 2023. When one looks more closely at the numbers and sees that defense spending made up 13 percent of total federal spending and 47 percent of discretionary spending in 2024, the defense budget no longer seems to be as miniscule as the New York Times and others have made it out to be. Moreover, the United States comprises roughly 40 percent of global military spending, a better measure of what is needed than as a share of the economy. The United States combined with its treaty allies account for about two-thirds of global military spending. If this is not enough, we have a strategy problem.
More specifically, this NDAA funds several programs that should be scrapped outright.
First is the Golden Dome for America. Developing this missile defense system is guaranteed to be well above the $150 billion price tag that the administration keeps touting—the Congressional Budget Office estimates at least $500 billion for countering no more than “rogue adversaries”—and it’s not even a sure thing it will work. The Golden Dome concept was supposedly modeled after Israel’s Iron Dome. Yet, Israel was unable to stop all of Iran’s incoming missiles during a series of strikes this past summer. Iron Dome is far from foolproof. Trying to expand Trump’s proposed missile defense system into the realm of nuclear weapons is hugely costly and risky at the same time.
Incoming missiles can overwhelm missile defenses for far lower costs. Their speed, use of decoys, and multiple warheads make such strikes extremely difficult to intercept. Moreover, Golden Dome intends to develop “boost-phase interceptors,” meaning US forces would destroy enemy missiles between the time they’re launched and when they just exit the earth’s atmosphere. The United States currently doesn’t have these sorts of interceptors for a good reason: It is extremely difficult to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost phase.
This NDAA also maintains the B‑1B bombers as part of America’s fleet of aircraft. They should be cut. Proponents of keeping these outdated, and historically controversial, bombers contend that they are needed to counter a rising China. Yet, the B‑1B is not stealth a bomber, making it of little use in evading enemy air defenses. Should the United States need a non-stealth bomber, it already has the B‑52, which has a lower operational cost compared to the B‑1B. Moreover, Northrop Grunman is currently developing the B‑21, the newest stealth bomber touted as eventually being “capable of penetrating the toughest defenses and deliver precision strikes anywhere in the world.” Why, then, keep the B‑1B around?
Finally, this NDAA includes funds for the development and procurement of the new LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. The NDAA authorizes $4.3 billion for procurement and research, development, test and evaluation funds for Sentinel missiles. As I’ve argued elsewhere, the United States does not need new ICBMs, as they would not add much value to America’s second-strike capability, and at the margin, they would increase the odds of a nuclear power launching a preemptive strike during a nuclear crisis. Instead, the United States should rely on its air- and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad, both of which are more than capable of sustaining America’s nuclear deterrence capabilities.
And all this is to say nothing of the operation and support costs (operation and maintenance plus personnel costs) that will accompany each of these defense projects. Operation and maintenance costs along with support costs make up a significant portion of the NDAA, with this year’s amounting to approximately 54 percent of authorized funds ($484.7 billion). The broader problem is the astronomical costs and dubious benefits that come with America’s grand strategy of primacy, which is the main driver of this bloated defense budget. By cutting overseas commitments, the United States can save billions of dollars in dead-end spending.
Having spent the country into $38 trillion of national debt to which it adds at the rate of $2 trillion each year, Congress has an obligation to make difficult choices on military spending. Unfortunately, it seems that Congress will once again pass the buck on this responsibility to the Pentagon, allowing the Trump administration to spend willy-nilly on instruments of war. All in all, imprudence—the antithesis of statesmanship—seems to be the calling card in the “Imperial Capital” with this NDAA.
